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ABSTRACT
ZHUZHA, KSENIYA Attributing Mind to Others: The underlying mechanism of the
timescale bias effect. Department of Psychology, June 2011.
ADVISOR: Bizer, George

Previous research has demonstrated that, when people speculate about the minds of
others, their judgments are subject to the timescale bias. People seem to attribute richer mind
experience to humans whose walking speed is closer to the average human walking speed than to
those whose speed is faster or slower. The present study investigated if self-projection is the
underlying mechanism of the bias by examining dispositional walking speed as a potential
moderator of the effect. Participants were asked to watch two videos of a human walking at slow,
medium, or fast speeds and then asked to speculate about the targets' mental capacities.
Participants' dispositional walking speed and their beliefs about their own mental capacities were
assessed. I hypothesized that, when the walking speed of an observed target is close to the
dispositional walking speed of the participant, the participant would be more likely to project his
or her own mental capacities onto that target. The data, however, did not support this hypothesis.
Furthermore, the timescale bias effect was not replicated when targets' walking speeds were
within normal range of human speed, raising a question about ecological validity of the
previously demonstrated effect. Consistent with the previous findings, participants attributed
more mind to the targets that were more liked and perceived to be the more similar to self. As
suggested by prior research, the mechanism responsible for these differences in mind attribution
to a target appears to involve the degree to which one considers and identifies target's mental
processes.
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Attributing Mind to Others:
The underlying mechanism of the timescale bias effect
Imagine today you see Bob for the first time in your life. What do you think of Bob? In
particular, to what extent do you think Bob is able to feel pain or joy? To what extent do you
think he is capable of remembering or planning? More generally, what could say about Bob’s
mind? Or why does it even matter?
Mind & Mind Perception
However, what do we mean when we say “mind”? We all are very familiar with this
notion, and its meaning seems to suggest itself. A layperson could describe mind as
“the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.”
(“Mind,” n.d., para. 1). About which agents, in that case, can we say “possess mind”? Would it
be any living entity that has a brain and is cable of perceiving pain? Consequently, most would
agree for example that bacteria, plants, or jelly fish do not have mind. However, is a frog or a bee
capable of mind? After all, both species have a nervous system and a brain. Of course we cannot
compare mental capacities of a frog to those of a human, but can we say that a frog does not have
mind at all? Once some minimal mental capacity is established, in other words, an agent is
mentalized (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003; Kozak, Marsh & Wegner, 2006), perhaps it would be more
accurate to question how much mind a particular agent has. When children are asked about mind
in objects, for example, they may grant objects some aspects of conscious experience and refuse
other (Piaget, 1929). Hence, a child may reason that a table feels if someone breaks it but cannot
feel being carried. Here the child does not think in terms of the dichotomy of “can feel” or
“cannot feel” but instead acknowledges possibilities in between. As speculating about mind in
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terms of “all or nothing” runs into certain restrains, when trying to establish mental capacities of
an agent, adults too may refer to a continuous scale (Gray, Gray & Wegner, 2007; Gray &
Wegner, 2009; Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner, 2007). Therefore, in my thesis, possession of
mental states likewise will be reviewed alluding to its degree rather than as a dichotomy.
Therefore, instead of scrutinizing whether or not a frog has mind, for example, I will consider
how much mind the frog has.
In the literature, mind is often described in terms of its attributes. Mind is said to be
constituted such mental states as consciousness, intelligence, self-control, emotion, emotion
recognition, purpose, belief, intention, and goal inference (e.g. Morewedge et al., 2007; Premack
& Woodruff, 1978; Woodward, 1998; Oates & Sheldon, 1987; Malle & Knobe, 1997a; Piaget,
1929; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Kozak et al., 2006; Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes,
Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez & Gaunt, 2000). Gray et al. (2007) proposed that these mental states
can be divided into two distinct mind dimensions: agency and experience. Agency is
characterized by the capabilities of self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition,
planning, communication and thought. Experience dimension, on the other hand, can be
described in terms of capacities for sensation (e.g. abilities to feel hunger, pain, etc.) and emotion
(e.g. abilities to feel rage, pride, joy, etc.). The two dimensions appear to be independent of each
other. In such a way, while participants evaluated an adult human to be highly capable of both
agency and experience, they identified a five-month-old infant with high capacity for experience,
but much lower capacity for agency. Furthermore, God was perceived to have much agency but
almost no experience, and a frog was thought to have very little agency but some experience.
Thus, if one believes that a given entity is highly capable of such mental states as thought and
self-control, it does not mean that the entity will also be perceived to have as much capacity for
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feelings of pain, pride, and embarrassment. Therefore, the second way in which we will consider
mind is in terms of particular mental states pertaining to one of the two dimensions, agency and
experience.
So how do you perceive Bob’s mind and mental states? Interestingly, given appropriate
cues, maybe even without awareness, you are able to make certain inferences about Bob’s mental
activity within seconds. Inferences of goals (e.g. Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2004; Aarts,
Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004; Poynor & Morris, 2003), intentions (e.g. Premack & Woodruff,
1978; Behner, Carpenter, Call, Tomasello, 2005), and traits (Trope, 1986; Gilbert, Pelham &
Krull, 1988) have been shown to occur rather effortlessly and spontaneously. For example,
Gilbert et al. (1988) argued that characterization of others, or trait inference, is a relatively
automatic process and involves little cognitive effort. Furthermore, findings by Hassin et al.
(2004) suggest that goal inference is an even simpler process and qualifies as automatic. In their
study, after reading short scenarios, some of which implied particular goals and some did not,
participants were cued with the words of implied goals that never appeared in the scenarios, and
were prompted to recall as many scenarios as they could. For example, consider the scenarios
Josh’s wife frequently annoys him and he thinks the time has come to call his lawyer, with the
implied goal – divorce, and Josh calls his lawyer, who tells him that his wife annoys him
frequently, with no goal implied. Divorce would later serve as a recall cue. In this, as well as in
similar follow-up experiments, participants recalled significantly more scenarios that implied
goals than those that did not. The effect also held for a lexical decision task. After reading each
scenario, participants were asked to judge whether presented group of letters was a word. For the
previously stated example, in experimental trial, the probe word would again be divorce. The
reaction time for test words was much shorter following goal-implied sentences than following
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control sentences. At that, sentences were presented for only 2.5s, and 500 ms later the test word
followed, demonstrating that not only that people infer goals without conscious awareness, but
they do so in a very short span of time. Similarly, interpreting intentions does not seem to
involve very sophisticated or effortful cognitive processes. It may be not surprising that most
adult humans are well skilled at this task. However, perhaps more surprisingly, chimpanzee and
9- to18- month old human babies are also capable of identifying intentions and goals of others
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Oates & Sheldon, 1987; Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1999; Gergely,
Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002; Molina, Walle & Spelke, 2004; Woodward, 1998; Behner et al, 2005).
Indeed, humans gain awareness of other minds in early infancy (Woodward, 1998;
Baron-Cohen, 1995), at about the same time as they learn object permanence (Baillargeon,
Spelke & Wass, 1985), but it is important to acknowledge that object knowledge and person
knowledge undergo different developmental processes (Oates & Sheldon, 1987; Molina et al.,
2004). Children learn about inanimate objects and their physical properties by acting upon them.
In response to their actions, objects produce certain effects (Oates & Sheldon, 1987). For
example, a toy may make noise when squeezed, a piece of paper will rip when pulled apart with
particular force, and a ball will jump up and down when dropped on the floor. At that, the
response of an object is always passive. People, on the other hand, are agents who respond to
social cues, such as crying, smiling, or babbling, and are capable of active interaction. It has been
illustrated, for example, that 5- to 6- month old infants are able to distinguish between actions
that should be directed at a person or an object (Molina et al., 2004). In one such study, children
were habituated to a visual stimulus of a person talking to an occluded target or manipulating the
target. In the test phase of the experiment, a person performed the same action as before (talking
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or manipulating), but the target was revealed: in one condition it was another person, and in the
other, it was a ball.
Therefore, in the natural condition, children saw that the person was talking to another
person and grasping and manipulating the ball, and, in the unnatural condition, they saw that the
person was talking to the ball, and manipulating the person. The results showed that, in the test
phase, children spent significantly more time looking at the natural actions than unnatural. The
natural and familiar actions were clearly preferred, which is common for children of that age (e.g.
Mehler, Jusczyk, Lambertz, Halsted, Bertoncini, & Amiel-Tison, 1988; Jusczyk, Hirsh-Pasek,
Kemler-Nelson, & Kennedy, 1992). Thus, just months into their lives, infants seem to understand
that people talk to other people and manipulate objects, and not the other way around.
Although it may be questionable whether infants are able to speculate about mental states
of others as early as 5 months of age (Woodward, 1998; Flavell et al., 1999), several studies have
illustrated that the theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), or in other words ability to
recognize mind in others, is acquired at 9- to 18- months at the latest (Woodward, 1998; Behner
et al., 2005; Gergely et al., 2002). Infants are capable of understanding that humans have
intentions, for instance. One study demonstrated that 9-month-old infants appear startled when
actions suddenly contradict seemingly previous intentions (Woodward, 1998). In this experiment,
the infants first watched a hand reach repeatedly for one of the two toys on a display. In the test
phase, the toys were switched and the hand either reached for the same toy at the new location or
for the different toy but to the same location. Infants looked reliably longer when the hand
reached for the different toy than in a different path for the same toy. Woodward (1988) argued
that the infants inferred that the person’s intention was to reach for a particular toy, and they
appeared surprised when the hand’s action contradicted this established intention. Likewise, 9-
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month-old infants demonstrated more patience when an adult acted as trying to pass them a toy
but was unable to than when the adult first acted as trying to pass the toy but then did not,
resembling teasing action (Behner et al., 2005). The infants seemed to understand the
experimenter’s true intentions, and, hence, acted differently in response. Clearly, 9-month-old
humans begin to speculate about the minds of others and are able to recognize that people have
desires (Malle & Knobe, 1997a) and thoughts that underlie their behavior.
It is no accident that person knowledge endures a separate developmental process and
mind theory is acquired that early in life. Interpretation of human mind seems to undergo quite a
different process than understanding inanimate objects (Dennett, 1996; Baron-Cohen, 1995). For
example, if one’s goal is to evaluate a stone and how it will behave if thrown, assessing its
physical properties, in other words taking Physical Stance, would probably be the most efficient
technique. Analyzing a human in terms of his or her anatomy, however, would not get one very
far with interpretation of intentions. Furthermore, in order to understand how a particular
computer or a car works, one would adapt the Design Stance. As suggested by the name, it
involves understanding an object in terms of its design and functions. For instance, if one has had
an encounter with a computer before, he or she would know that the left double-click of a mouse
can open a file, and, if the Caps Lock key is pressed, all letters typed will be uppercase. Thus, by
knowing the general design of computers and functions of their parts, one can figure out how to
work with a computer of a new brand quite easily. When it comes to humans, design stance can
tell us about various functions of human body and how it operates. Taking this stance, one can
infer that if water is splashed in person’s face, his or her automatic reaction would be to close
their eyes. Yet, this strategy is very limited for understanding human mind and behavior. In order
to understand agent’s actions and predict its behavior, one should consider agent’s possible
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intentions and goals. In other words, one should adapt the Intentional Stance towards the agent.
As we are constantly surrounded by other people, this stance proves extremely useful. If your
friend is in her room putting make up, you will understand that she is getting ready to go out. If
your mom gazes at you with a straight face, you might infer that she is unhappy with you about
something. People with autism, for example, lack this ability (Baron-Cohen, 1995). For a person
unable to take the intentional stance, the world could seem chaotic and bizarre. Without aptitude
to infer intentions, one would not know why people behave in a certain way and what to expect
from them. At every single moment, such a person would be in for a surprise as he or she would
not be able to predict the behavior of others. Thus, inferring about mental states of other agents is
an exceptionally important skill that helps us navigate through daily life and successfully interact
with others.
From the evolutionary point of view, this skill may have also facilitated survival of the
species. Living in large groups as do humans and other primates, involves quite complex social
interactions (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In order for a group to survive and prosper, its members
should be capable of effective collaboration, which is partly ensured by the ability to share
intentions and emotions (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005). Therefore, natural
selection may have preferred individuals with better social skills (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Lewin, 1992; Leaky & Lewin, 1992). In many species, reproductive success of an individual
member is often determined by his or her size and physical fitness (Lewin, 1992; Leaky & Lewin,
1992). In higher primates, however, individual strength may not be the biggest advantage.
Instead, a member with more alliances and higher social standing is more likely to dominate and
has higher chances of reproduction (Lewin, 1992; Leaky & Lewin, 1992).
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Additional evidence that mind attribution serves an adaptive function was provided by
Maner et al. (2005), who manipulated the salience of self-protective and mate-search motives.
When the motives were activated, participants were more likely to attribute motive-relevant
mental states to socially-relevant human targets. Once the self-protective motive was salient,
participants reported seeing more anger in a black male’s face. Similarly, when the mate-search
motive was activated, male participants perceived greater sexual arousal in the faces of attractive
females.
Furthermore, acknowledging goals and rationales behind other people’s behavior plays
an important role in learning by imitation (Gergely et al, 2002; Byrne & Russon, 1998). One
study suggested that 14-month-old infants imitating adults’ actions do so rationally rather than
simply engaging in emulation (Gergely et al., 2002). Children in the experiment re-enacted an
adult’s behavior of switching on a light-box, using their head significantly more often if they
observed the adult engaging in this behavior while her hands were free than if they observed the
adult doing so while her hands were occupied. As argued by the authors, the infants, who
watched the first scenario, must have inferred that there was a reason for using the head instead
of hands and hence were more likely to imitate the action. Conversely, in the later scenario, it
was obvious that the actor used her head because her hands were occupied, and, not having such
a restraint themselves, infants were reluctant to imitate the observed actions. It seems, therefore,
that making inferences about others’ actions may have a particular significance in learning
processes and development. It has been shown that adults likewise use inferences about goals of
others to guide their own actions and behavior (Aarts et al, 2004; Byrne & Russon, 1998;
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).

THE UNDERLYING MECHANISM OF THE TIMESCALE BIAS

11

Attributing mind helps us learn from our environment, understand it, and act accordingly.
Thus, interpreting intentions and emotions helps us make sense of others’ actions, speculate
about their underlying goals, and predict future behavior. Once we have this understanding and
the ability to foresee future events, we can respond appropriately, thereby playing a role of active
agents influencing our environment. It has been suggested that by doing so, we satisfy effectance
motivation, the human motive to interact effectively with our environment and control it (White,
1959; Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007; Waytz, Morewedge, Epley, Monteleone, Gao &
Cacioppo, 2010). Attributing mental states to others, therefore, has to be particularly common if
there is a need or incentive to understand a particular situation or predict future events (Epley et
al., 2007). For example, if we hold no knowledge about a particular agent, or its behavior
appears to be unpredictable, in order to understand what is going on and gain some control over
the situation, we could try to take an intentional stance and infer about agent’s goals in a way
would makes sense to us (Higgins, 1996). Thus, sometimes we end up attributing human-like
intentions and desires to animals and even inanimate objects. In a study by Waytz et al. (2010),
participants read about robotic gadgets that were described as either predictable or not, and later
reported how much mind the gadgets appeared to possess. Consistent with the theory,
participants anthropomorphized seemingly unpredictable gadgets significantly more, suggesting
that mental attributions are driven by our motivation to understand and predict our environment.
Thus, attributing mind and inferring mental states appears to be evolutionary adaptive. It
helps us function in our environment effectively, comes to us naturally, and does not involve
much cognitive effort. However, which identities and aspects of target’s behavior do we rely on
when attributing mind to targets? Let us come back to Bob. Today you saw Bob for the first time
in your life as he walked down the street. Recent findings suggest that the way you think of
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Bob’s mental experience may depend on how fast Bob walks down the street (Morewedge et al.,
2007).
Mind & Motion
Though seemingly basic, one’s movement dynamic may convey tremendous information
to the perceiver. We are so familiar with a walking pattern of a human that recognizing one when
we see it or identifying individual gait discrepancies seems to be a quite simple task. For
example, we can easily recognize the walk of a person even when we see only fragments of the
person’s silhouette. One study demonstrating this employed videos with point-light walkers
(Johansson, 1973). Participants were shown a video in which only light-reflective patches
attached to the main joints of a walker were visible. All participants were able to immediately
recognize that the picture presented a walking person even when the video was distorted, when
the exposure to the stimulus lasted only 1 second, and when the number of light points on
walker’s body was reduced down to 5. Furthermore, gait may give us information about walker’s
gender. In such a way, in other studies involving videos of point-light walkers, the correct
identifications of target’s gender were well above chance (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977; Mather &
Murdoch, 1994). Mather & Murdoch (1994) also argued that the dynamic cues of a walking
pattern play the main role in gender recognition. Thus, it is not feminine or masculine body
structure that seems to be important in correct recognition of point-light walker’s gender. It is
rather velocities in a body sway that appear to provide observers with critical information about
the gender of a person walking in front of them. Finally, if familiar enough with target’s gait, a
person may learn to identify the target by his/her walk without any external information (Troje,
Westhoff, & Lavrov, 2005). For example, most of us on several occasions probably have
identified a friend, a neighbor, or a colleague from far away by recognizing his or her walk.
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Findings by Troje et al. (2005) suggest that when this effect occurs, the target’s walking
frequency plays a greater role for recognition than body size and shape. In sum, it seems that a
person’s walk alone can provide an observer with significant enough information to identify the
walker’s gender and at times even identity. The literature suggests that, when it comes to a
target’s walk, gait dynamics and walking frequency may serve as important cues for recognition.
Motion, however, may also speak to a target’s agency and may be indicative of presence
or absence of intentions and, hence, mind. It has been aforementioned that our understanding of
inanimate objects and people develops differently (Oates & Sheldon, 1987; Molina et al., 2004).
In such a way, babies learn about objects by acting upon them, while they learn about humans by
interacting with them and observing their agency. However, I would like to generalize the above
claims to inanimate vs. animate objects (rather limiting them to humans). After all, even though
not in the same way, we also interact with animals, insects, and many other entities that are able
to move on its own. For example, if a person tires to catch a fly, it will try to get away from him
or her. If a person pets a cat, it may purr, and so on and so forth. In addition, anything that moves
on its own can cause things to happen. Of course the ability to cause events varies from agent to
agent. For example, a cat can knock your favorite vase off of a table, but a fly cannot.
Nevertheless, it does not mean that a fly is incapable of agency. Flies can bite and maybe even
keep you awake by buzzing around your bedroom. In sum, it seems that there is something
special about beings that are capable of self-propelled movement. They can be thought of as
agents and, therefore, can be attributed goals and intentions. Perhaps the intention of more
primitive organisms is simply survival; yet their actions (or simply pattern of motion in a case of
plankton or bacteria) can be explained by this intention. Several theorists argue that selfpropelled motion can be the key indicator of mind possession. Once a person establishes that an

THE UNDERLYING MECHANISM OF THE TIMESCALE BIAS

14

agent exhibits signs indicative of mind, he or she may engage in further mind attribution:
speculating about specific mental capacities and the amount of mind the agent may possess
(Premack, 1990; Piaget, 1929; Baron-Cohen, 1995).
However, findings by Csibra et al. (1999) indicate that the establishment of selfpropulsion in a target may not be a requirement for mind attribution. In other words, even if there
is no evidence that a target’s motion is self-initiated, a target’s movement may be interpreted as
goal-directed. The basic mechanism responsible for detecting agency and determining if a given
target possesses intentions is known as Intentionality Detector (ID) (Baron-Cohen, 1995). BaronCohen (1995) argued that ID does consider self-propelled motion to determine if a target is an
agent, but it operates by using rather loose criteria. For example, if the cause of motion is not
easily established (i.e. it is unclear whether motion is internally or externally initiated), ID will
classify the target as an agent by default. According to Baron-Cohen (1995), ID favors the
establishment of agency for evolutionary reasons. When one’s goal is survival, it is best to be on
guard at all times. Hence, “it is better to spot a potential agent, and start checking its desires and
goals, than to ignore it” (p. 35). Thus, if a cause of motion is somewhat ambiguous, ID may
mistakenly classify a moving object as an agent.
The works of Piaget (1929) seem to support the notion that ID establishes agency by
default and suggests that the mechanism becomes more selective with development. Very young
infants, in the first stage of conscious attribution, may think that inanimate objects are capable of
intentions. Soon this belief changes, however, and infants in the second stage seem to think of
everything that moves as an agent, such as wind, sun, a bicycle, etc. In this stage, they seem not
to have the capacity yet to question the source that brings a given object in motion. When an
infant reaches the third stage, on the other hand, he or she seems be more likely to consider
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presence of self-propelled motion when reasoning about object’s agency and intentions.
Consequently, even though the mechanism of ID is not perfect and is prone to mistakes, the
information it seems to utilize, when determining whether a target possesses agency, is target’s
motion.
In fact, as research illustrates, motion may play an important part in attribution of mind,
intentions, and even personality traits. In a classic study by Heider and Simmel (1944)
participants, were shown a film depicting three moving geometric figures, big and small triangles
and a circle. In one of the tasks, participants were asked to describe what happened in the film.
Interestingly, in their reports, all participants but one spoke of geometric figures as of animated
beings (people in most of the cases), once again supporting the notion that, for a human observer,
self-propelled movement in objects is indicative of their agency. In another experiment,
participants were asked to describe the kind of a person the big triangle, the small triangle, and
the circle appeared to be. From the participants’ reports it seems that the majority of them had
similar perceptions each figure’s personality. The big triangle was mostly described as
aggressive and dominating, small triangle as courageous, and circle as timid and fearful. Thus,
the participants were tentative to attribute particular characteristics to a given figure simply
based on its pattern of movement relative to that of the other two figures. Furthermore, when
simply asked to describe what happened in the picture, many participants actually wrote
connected stories. One participant, for example, wrote in his report that there was a man (big
triangle) waiting for a girl (circle). The girl, however, came with another man (small triangle).
The participant then went on to describe the action in the film as a conflict between the three
people. Consequently, besides indicating agency in a target, objects’ movements (or something
about the movements) also seem to suggest perception of the events in terms of interactions
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between the objects. In the study by Bassili (1976) participants watched a video clip depicting
two circles chasing each other, clarified that specifically temporal contingency of a chase, and
not spatial configuration of the two circles, was the key cue indicating the existence of
meaningful (i.e. particular to beings with intentions and mind) interaction between the figures.
As the research described above suggests, motion may provide an observer with
important information about a target’s intentions and state of mind. Let us take a closer look at
walking as a form of movement. For a healthy human, walking is one of the most common
activities in which he or she inevitably engages. It is a form of movement with which most
humans are incredibly familiar. After all, all around the world, the vast majority of the people
walk and observe others walk every single day. Although walking appears to be a rudimentary
activity and rarely special, it may tell more about a person that one would think. As we have
already seen, the walking frequency and dynamics of person’s gait may serve as cues for
recognition. It also appears that walking speed plays an important role in the process of mind
attributions.
Egocentrism as Anchoring and Adjustment
Research by Morewedge et al. (2007) illustrated that the closer an agent’s speed is to the
average speed of a human, whether the agent is an animal, a robot, another human, or simply an
animated “blob”, the more mind perceivers tend to attribute to the agent. In other words, as
people attribute mental states to other agents, they seem to demonstrate a bias based on agent’s
relative speed of movement—the timescale bias. In one of the studies, participants watched three
films of a human walking at three different paces: slower-than-average, average, and faster-thanaverage human walking speeds. Subsequently, participants were asked to make judgments about
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the target human. To assess mind attribution, participants were asked to report on 7-point Likert
scale the degree to which the target appeared to have mind, to be competent, intelligent, and
smart. Significantly more mind was attributed to the entities and humans moving with a speed
close to the average human speed than to those moving slower or faster. The authors suspected
that the most probable explanation for the phenomenon is egocentric bias (Morewedge et al.,
2007; Epley et al., 2007). We must have a starting point for induction when we attempt to
understand, characterize, or predict behaviors of a novel agent. If we hold no knowledge about
the specific agent, in order to begin speculating about its behavior, we need to use some kind of
knowledge as a base line. The idea is to compare a novel concept to something well-known to
facilitate a better understanding of its structure and properties. Similarly, trying to reason about
novel stimuli, people naturally tend to rely on already existing knowledge that is easily
accessible and use it as a reference point (Higgins, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). What could
such knowledge be? Not surprisingly, one of the most developed concepts all humans have is the
concept of self (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004; Epley et al., 2007; Epley, Caruso &
Bazerman, 2006; Piaget, 1929). No matter how well we may know other people, we always
know ourselves better. Only if one could possess somebody else’s body and, thus, gain a direct
access to this person’s brain, sensory organs, and thoughts, one could truly understand the other.
Even as adults, we can never completely apprehend what it is like to be somebody else, in the
same way, we can never grasp what it is like to be a dog or even a person of an opposite gender.
Understanding one’s self is rudimentary; it develops early and serves as a basis for
understanding of others (e.g. Heal, 1986; Piaget, 1929; Epley et al., 2007). In a similar manner, it
has been theorized that children learn theory of mind through imitation of others (Meltzoff &
Brooks, 2001). By repeating human acts, they gain understanding of mental states that the person
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performing the acts is experiencing. Thus, the understanding of others comes by the way of first
understanding the self. Furthermore, by imitating others and seeing others imitate them, children
deduce that “others are like me” (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001: 174). In fact, it seems to be quite
difficult for a human to overcome this formed schema that others are “like me”. As mentioned
above, it is difficult to grasp a mental state if it is not experienced directly. Similarly, it takes
some time for children to learn that others may have mental states that deviate from their own.
Before this understanding develops, they tend to exhibit so-called egocentrism. Repacholi &
Gopnik (1997) gave 14- and 18-month old children crackers and broccoli. As it was intended,
most of the children showed preference for the crackers. In the next phase of the experiment, a
child watched an adult to sample each of the foods, but, contrary to the child’s choice, the adult
acted to strongly dislike the cracker, but to be pleased with the broccoli. Later, the child was
seated at a table with a bowl of broccoli and a bowl of crackers in front of him or her. The adult,
seated across the table, turned to child, saying, “Can you give me some?” Most of 14-month-old
infants exhibited egocentrism and gave the experimenter a cracker. To the contrary, a majority of
18-month old infants attended to the experimenter’s preferences and handed her the broccoli.
Hence, it seems that younger children have difficulty recognizing that thoughts, wishes, and
preferences of others may not be the same as theirs.
Even though egocentrism decreases significantly with age, it does not disappear
completely. Adults also refer to the readily accessible knowledge of self when making inferences
about other agents (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Epley & Morewedge et al.,
2004; Nickerson, 1999; Barr & Keysar, 2002). In fact, it seems that adults’ egocentrism is
similar to the one in children, but what makes a difference is the subsequent effortful correction.
Epley & Morewedge et al. (2004) used an eye-tracking device in a referential communication
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task to demonstrate this phenomenon. Adults and children were asked by an experimenter, who
sat across the table, to move objects from one box to another on a shelf in front of them. Some
boxes were screened off by a wooden slat from the side of the experimenter in making them
visible only to the participant. When asking to move objects, the experimenter at times would
refer to them relative to his/her perspective. For example, the participants might have been asked
to move the smallest toy car. However, the smallest toy car on the shelf would be in a box not
visible to the experimenter; hence, the participant had to realize that the experimenter was
actually referring to the medium-size car. On these test trials, children and adults exhibited same
initial egocentric bias. The first object most of the participants looked at was the one visible only
to them, and both, children and adults, gazed at the egocentric object equally fast. Nevertheless,
adults made far less errors in reaching for the wrong object and were faster to look at the correct
object. Thus the findings support the notion that humans never really outgrow their egocentrism,
but rather become skilled at the correcting it.
So what is the egocentric bias? It appears that egocentrism is a type of “anchor and
adjustment” heuristic (mental shortcut) that facilitates fast reasoning without using much
cognitive resources (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nickerson, 1999; Epley & Keysar et al., 2004).
Knowledge about one’s self is solid and easily accessible, and in many cases using this
knowledge as a reference point is useful. After all, despite idiosyncrasies, all humans are alike.
Thus, making judgments about another human relying on one’s own experience is quite a
reliable technique. As a result, even adults use self-knowledge as a starting point for induction
(an anchor), and then serially adjust accordingly using other available information about the
person and the context (Nickerson, 1999; Epley & Keysar at al., 2004). The pitfall of this
heuristic, however, is that the final judgments remain too close to the original anchor (Slovic &
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Lichtenstein, 1979). The reason for this insufficient adjustment seems to be that people stop
correcting not after they reach the best estimate possible, but after they reach only satisfactory
accuracy (Epley & Keysar et al., 2004). Indeed, despite the adjustment, adults still make
egocentric errors. For example, in one study, participants listened to an ambiguous message left
on an answering machine, which could have been interpreted as either sarcastic or not (Epley &
Keysar et al., 2004). Beforehand, however, some of the participants read a scenario which
clarified the meaning of the message, and some did not. Later they were asked if a listener, who
did not read the scenario, would find speaker’s intention to be clear. The results revealed that
informed participants overestimated the clarity of the speaker’s intention. Other studies have also
shown that people tend to impute their own knowledge on others and overestimate the extent to
which others share their opinions and attitudes (e.g. Keysar & Bly, 1995; Keysar, Ginzel &
Bazerman, 1995; Barr & Keysar, 2002; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Green & House, 1977).
In the case of the timescale bias effect, people may be attributing most mind to the targets
walking at average human speed because they use themselves as a starting point of induction.
However, as no other contextual information is available about the target (such as goals,
intentions, personality, attitudes, etc.) or the situation, the perceiver is not able to engage in full
correction of the original anchor (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope & Alfieri, 1997; Read et al., 1990),
attributing his or her own mental states to the target as a result. When speculating about a person
walking down the street, the most obvious similarity cue is the speed of the target’s gait.
Consequently, the closer the target’s walking speed is to the one of the perceiver, the stronger the
egocentric bias should be, and the perceiver should be more tentative to attribute mental states to
the target that are similar to their own. As I have stated before, while it is difficult to truly
understand what it is like to be somebody else, humans are experts in self-knowledge as they
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have direct experience with own senses and thoughts. Morewedge et al. (2007) argued that, as a
result, people may tend to perceive themselves to be capable of “richer experience of mind” than
others. While it seems to be so (Gray et al., 2007), in Morewedge et al.’s (2007) experiment
involving humans, attribution of mind was assessed by asking participants to rate the extent “to
which the target appeared to be competent, to be intelligent, to be smart, and to have mind.” All
of the characteristics listed are framed as favorable characteristics. It has been repeatedly shown
that people tend to evaluate themselves to be better than average on desirable traits, which
adheres to a positive view of self and self-esteem (Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher,
Yurak & Vredenburg, 1995; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). Thus, another plausible explanation could
be that people project favorable traits onto the similar targets as they tend to think that they
possess desirable characteristics to the greater extent than an average person.
Regardless of this mechanism, if the timescale bias effect is explained by egocentrism,
then it should be moderated by dispositional walking speed of the perceiver. In other words,
people should be more likely to attribute mind to those human targets whose speed of gait is the
most similar to the one of their own rather than to average human walking speed. However, even
if perceivers’ dispositional walking speed was assessed in the study by Morewedge et al. (2007),
this effect would not have been detected as faster and slower moving human targets in this study
walked with speeds that are outside of the walking speed range that one could normally observe
in the geographic region where the study was administered (Inman et al., 1981; Bornstein &
Bornstein, 1976). As a result, the walking speed researchers used as average would best
approximate the majority of the population, hence, disregarding possible individual differences.
One perhaps could argue that using normal range of human gait speed may be ineffective as
differences are not easily observable. I believe, however, that even within the average walking
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speed range, the differences are pronounced enough to detect. Supporting evidence is presented
in the study by Jacobs & Shiffrar (2005), in which observers made fewest errors in making
judgments about point-light walker’s speed of gait as relative to their own, when point-light
walker’s speed was within the average speed range (3.5 – 4.5 km/hr) and deviated from the one
of the observer by 0.5km/hr.
There is another important point in the theory describing egocentrism as an example of
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. According to Ames (2004), people should project their
own mental states onto other agents only when the agents appear to be similar to themselves.
Conversely, when speculating about others that appear different from the self, perhaps applying
self-knowledge as an anchor may seem to be somewhat inadequate. In such a case, people may
resort to a different type of knowledge that is likewise easily accessible—stereotypes. Indeed,
participants, who were told that a target individual responded to given questions in a similar
manner as they, were more likely to attribute their own mental states to the target than the
participants who were told that no answer of the target individual matched their own. The
findings also revealed that in the latter condition, participants were more likely to evaluate the
target individual according to their stereotypes. For example, if the target was described to be a
medical student, participants’ evaluations of the target agreed with their reported beliefs about a
typical med-student (Ames, 2004). Thus, I hypothesize that observers’ dispositional walking
speed should serve as a moderator in timescale bias effect. Specifically, when a target’s walking
speed is close to the dispositional gait speed of an observer, it will serve as a cue of similarity
between the observer and the target. Hence the observer will be more likely to use egocentric
anchoring and attribute his or her own mental states to that target. Furthermore, I hypothesize
that in a case of a target walking faster or slower than a perceiver (i.e. appearing dissimilar),
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when speculating about mental states of this target, the perceiver will be more likely to use
stereotypes as an anchor and make inferences consistent with his/her beliefs about slow or fast
walkers respectively.
Walking Speed
However, for walking speed to be a characteristic cue, certain requirements should be
met. First of all, the speed with which one walks should be relatively stable throughout time. In
other words, every person should have a natural tendency to walk at a certain speed rather than
adapting different velocities every day. Next, there should be differences in walking speeds
across people, and finally, the differences should be significant enough to be detectable.
From our daily life experiences, it seems that people really do have tendency to walk at
certain speeds. Most of us can probably think of friends, co-workers or neighbors who seem to
be naturally slow or fast walkers. Scientific evidence suggests that, in fact, every person has a
walking speed that is natural to them (Ralston, 1958; Corcoran & Brengelmann, 1970; Inman,
Ralston, & Todd, 1981). It seems that this “natural” speed yields a form of biological
“Conservation of Energy” law (Inman et al., 1981). Specifically, a person’s natural walking
speed is the speed that is the most efficient for him or her considering the distance walked and
energy spent (Ralston, 1958; Corcoran & Brengelmann, 1970). In his study, Ralston (1958)
measured participants’ energy expenditures when they were walking at different speeds around a
track. The findings revealed that the relationship between energy expended per meter walked per
kilogram of body weight (Em = calories/meter/kg) and walking speed (v=meters/min) can be
represented by so called energy cost curve with Em on the y-axis and v on the x-axis. The curve
becomes infinitely large as walking speed becomes infinitely large and as walking speed
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approaches 0. In other words, if one walks extremely slowly or extremely fast, his or her energy
expenditure per distance unit is very large. Thus, the distance passed is not justified by energy
spent, resulting in inefficient use of resources. The energy cost curve, however, has a minimum
point. This point corresponds to person’s optimal walking speed at which the use of resources is
the most efficient (Ralston, 1958; Corcoran & Brengelmann, 1970). Figure 4 illustrates energy
cost curve produced by using average values obtained in Ralston’s (1958) study. Thus, for
participants of this study, optimal walking speed will fall somewhere between v=65 and v=85 as
the Em curve is the most flat between these values. For every person, the curve representing
relationship between energy expenditure and walking speed will follow a similar pattern as in the
Figure above. However, for every person, the lowest point on the curve lies at a different speed
and represents his or her individual optimal speed, which he or she will be most likely to adapt
when walking (Ralston, 1958).
The next question is whether these individual differences in walking speeds are
significantly divergent. Normal humans may adapt walking speeds as slow as 2.5km/hr and as
fast as 6.0 km/hr, with most speeds falling within the range 3.5km/hr – 4.5km/hr (Inman et al.
1981; Jacobs & Shiffrar, 2005). Depending on a population, this range may shift towards faster
or slower speeds (Bornstein & Bornstein 1976; Knoblauch, Levine & Norenzayan, 1988; Finnis
& Walton, 2008; Pietrucha, & Nitzburg, 1996). For example, in certain cities with larger
populations size the mean walking speed of pedestrians may reach 5.4km/hr (Finnis & Walton,
2008). Nevertheless, these are only numbers, and the more important question is whether people
are able to detect differences in walking speeds. Jacobs & Shiffrar (2005) conducted a study in
which participants performed a speed-discrimination task. In the first condition, standing
participants observed two point-light walkers, whose gait speeds differed by 0.5km/hr, and
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Energy Cost Curve 1

Figure 1.

Relationship between energy expenditure in calories/meter/kg and speed.

discriminated between their relative speeds. In the second and third conditions, participants
performed the same task while walking on a moving treadmill or pedaling on a stationary bicycle.
In all three conditions, participants’ accuracy in determining which point-light target walked
faster and which slower was above chance. Standing participants showed the best performance
but did not differ significantly from participants in the cycling condition. Walking participants
had the lowest accuracy rate. Thus, from the results of this study, it seems that people are in fact
capable of detecting walking speed differences as small as 0.5km/hr.
Note. From “Energy-speed relation and optimal speed during level walking,” by H.J. Ralston,
1958, Int. Z. angew. Physiol, 17, p. 281.
1
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Consequently, every person appears to walk at a speed that is most energy efficient for
him or her. This natural speed differs from individual to individual and generally falls between
2.5km/hr and 6.0km/hr. Most importantly, differences in normal walking speeds are detectable.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said for certain that, when seeing a person walking, one automatically
(with no suggestion or prompt) analyzes whether their own dispositional walking speeds differs
from that of the observed target. However, considering timescale bias effect and significance of
gait speed reviewed earlier, I speculate that the speed with which an observed target walks will
serve as a similarity cue (between self and the target) and will play part in mind attribution.
Current Research
The main goal of the present research was to examine the underlying mechanism of the
timescale bias effect by studying the role of dispositional walking speed in one’s perception of
the minds of other walking humans. The timescale bias was demonstrated by Morewedge et al.
(2007), and it is based on the fact that humans walking at an average speed are attributed more
mind by others than humans walking at faster or slower speeds. One of the possible processes
that underlie this effect may be the egocentric bias. Thus, when observing a walking person
whom the observer holds no previous knowledge about, it could be that the observer uses the self
as a reference point in attempt to evaluate the mental capacities of the person observed. As a
result, the observer may end up projecting his or her own mental states onto another person.
However, this self-projection should occur only if the target subject to evaluation is perceived by
the observer to be similar to self in one way or another. Therefore, I hypothesized that if a
target’s walking speed is close to that of an observer, the observer will encode the resemblance
between him or her and the target and, as a result, project his or her own mental states onto the
target.
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If a target is perceived as dissimilar, on the other hand, using self as a reference may not
be a reasonable technique. In such a case, people may resort to stereotypes. Consequently, I
predicted that, if an observer’s dispositional walking speed is slower or faster than the speed of a
walking target, then the target will be perceived as dissimilar to self and will be attributed mind
according to the observer’s beliefs about mental capacities of slow and fast walkers.
However, Morewedge et al. (2007found that the targets walking with average human
speed were attributed the most mind. This phenomenon can also be explained by the egocentric
bias. While it is difficult to fully understand the mental experiences of another person, every
person is very familiar with his or her own mental activities. Consequently, people may tend to
grant themselves richer mental capacities than other people. Then, projecting his or her own
mental capacities onto a target seen as alike, one may end up attributing more mind to this person
than to others who are perceived as dissimilar. However, it is well known that people,
particularly in individualistic societies, often tend to overestimate themselves in regard to
positive characteristics and underestimate themselves in regard to negative characteristics. The
four attributes that Morewedge et al. (2007) used to measure mind (intelligent, smart, competent,
and possessing mind) seem to represent desirable characteristics (Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). In
fact, when asked to indicate whether a positive characteristic describes them, people seem to
automatically respond that it does. Conscious processes, on the other hand, inhibit this desire of
self-enhancement. For example, having the motivation and sufficient mental resources, people
actually tend to correct this bias and evaluate their skills and characteristics rather objectively
(Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). Projection, however, happens outside of conscious process. Thus, if
projection were the mechanism underlying the process of mind attribution to the targets walking
at the average human gait speed, the desirability of the projected mind attributes could be the
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reason why participants perceived these targets as possessing the most mind. The present study
also addressed this question by assessing the desirability of all the attributes measuring mind.
Thus, if people grant themselves richer mind experience as a whole, then ratings of personal
mental states will not be associated with their desirability. If the extent to which attributes are
seen as positive or negative does play a role, however, then people should rate themselves higher
on more desirable characteristics than on the less desirable ones.
Furthermore, while Morewedge et al. (2007) used intelligence, competency, and mind
possession as features of mental states, the present study explored attribution of mind in terms of
mind’s two dimensions: agency and experience. In addition, in Morewedge et al. (2007)
participants were presented with the videos of a human walking at one of the three speeds:
slower than average (1.66 - 2.41 km/hr), average (4.86 - 5.15 km/hr), or faster than average (7.31
- 8.03 km/hr). In the average condition, the target human’s walking speed approximated the
average walking speed in a city with a similar population size (Bornstein & Bornstein, 1976).
However, in the slow and fast conditions, walking speeds of the target humans were outside the
normal walking speed range (Inman et al., 1981; Raltson 1958). Thus, walking speeds that were
presented in the stimuli videos can almost never be observed in a natural setting, which questions
the generalizability of the effect found in the study. In may be that the differences in mind
attribution to average, slow, and fast walkers do not exist when their gait speeds are within the
range of normal human speed. The methodology of the present study addressed this issue.
Stimuli videos developed for this study captured humans walking at slow, average, and fast
speeds within the range of normal human walking speed.
Furthermore, stimuli films used in the original study, besides the target human, included
other pedestrians walking down the street who were not part of the experiment, which may have
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served as a confound. In another experiment by Morewedge et al. (2007), the stimulus video
portrayed an animated “blob” moving down the street populated with animated pedestrians.
Instead of the blob’s speed, the speed of the pedestrians was manipulated. Interestingly,
participants attributed the most mind to the blob when its speed was the closest to the one of
animated pedestrians. Thus, it seems that instead of considering the blob’s absolute speed, the
participants perceived it in comparison to the speed with which the pedestrians moved. Since in
the experiment involving humans, slow and fast walking targets moved at the speeds that were
outside of normal human walking range, they may have stood out in the view of other
pedestrians walking in the film. As a result, participants could have attributed the most mind to
the targets walking the average speed because they walked similar to the other pedestrians and
hence appeared normal. Stimulus videos of the current experiment controlled for this possible
confound. Besides the target human walking down the street, there were no other pedestrians or
cars moving in the films.
The present study also explored three other possible moderators of mind attribution that
were not part of the original timescale bias study. One of them is the target’s likability. Kozak et
al. (2006) asked participants to rate the mental capacities of a target character described in a
vignette. The description of the character was either more or less favorable, thus manipulating
the target’s likability. The results of the study indicated that people tend to attribute more mind
to a likable person than to an unlikable person. Consequently, the present study considered
likability of a walking target as a potential moderator.
Next, there is evidence suggesting that people may differ in the way in which they
attribute mind to other targets as a function of their personality. According to the theory of
anthropomorphism, the more a person is motivated to understand and predict the behavior of a
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novel agent, the more likely he or she would be to apply available information and preexisting
knowledge in attempts to analyze the target (Epley et al., 2007). In one of the studies,
participants were more likely to anthropomorphize a robot seen on a video when their motivation
to predict the robot’s behavior was artificially augmented (Waytz et al., 2010). In the highmotivation condition, participants were offered a monetary reward for each correct response to
the questions asking about the robot’s subsequent actions. In the control condition, participants
were not asked to predict the robot’s actions nor were they offered a reward for their responses.
As a result, participants who had greater motivation to deliberate about the robot’s future
behavior were more likely to attribute human-like mental states to the robot than the less
motivated participants. The effect of motivation to predict future behavior of a target, however,
has not been explored in the situations involving mind attributions to other humans. Nevertheless,
according to the theory, people who are more motivated to understand and control their
environment should be more tentative to search for sources that would help them speculate about
the mental states of newly encountered targets. Likewise, these people should be more likely to
rely on such sources as self-knowledge and stereotypes. Thus, the dispositional tendency to
control one’s own environment, as measured by the desire for control scale (Burger & Hemans,
1988) was considered as a second moderator.
Lastly, need for closure (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) is
another stable personality trait that the present study assessed as potential moderators. Need for
closure assesses a person’s desire to have a definite answer regarding a subject as opposed to
tolerance towards ambiguity. People high in need for closure aspire for fast solutions and may be
more tentative to quickly form their opinions using information available at hand (Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996). By the same token, such individuals could be more motivated to make fast
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judgments about people they observe, making them more sensitive to various cues available that
would help them succeed at the task. Thus, people scoring high in need for closure may be more
likely to attend to target’s walking speed and refer to this information when making assumptions
about target’s mental capacities.
Pilot Study: Dispositional Walking Speed
The purpose of the pilot study was to establish the range of walking speeds on the college
campus where the study was conducted. Furthermore, slow, medium, and fast speeds for the
target population needed to be determined in order to produce video stimuli for the study.
Method
Participants
Forty-six undergraduate students at a northeast college participated in this study in
exchange for either a psychology course credit or cash compensation.
Material and Procedure
Participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire about their political attitudes.
When a participant completed the task, a researcher asked him or her to drop the filled out
questionnaire in the survey box that was located down the hallway and around the corner from
the lab where the experiment took place. This path generally had very little student and faculty
traffic, which helped reduce possible obstacles that could have slowed down the participants.
The experiment was set up in such a way that only one participant at a time walked to the survey
box. The total path length was 56.5 meters. As soon as a participant stepped over the door line of
the lab, a researcher pressed the start button on the Stopwatch Collection electronic stopwatch in
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a way that was not visible to the participant. When the participant stepped over the door line
coming back to the lab, the researcher pressed the stop button and recorded the elapsed time.
Results
The walking speeds ranged from 3.41km/hr to 5.64km/hr. The speeds were normally distributed
with a mean of 4.39km/hr, a mode of 4.09km/hr, and a median of 4.5km/hr (Figure 2).
Dispositional Walking Speed Distribution

Figure 2.

Distribution of dispositional walking speeds in the pilot study.
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Methods
Participants
Sixty-seven undergraduate students, 21 male and 42 female, at a northeast college
participated in this study in exchange for either a psychology course credit or cash compensation.
Materials
Video stimuli.

Participants were shown videos of a male and female actors walking

down the street at slow, medium, or fast speeds. Thus, in total six clips were created. The
walking speeds of both female and male actors were adjusted to 3.92km/hr (slow), 4.66km/hr
(medium), and 5.72km/hr (fast) by using Final Cut Express computer program. The films’
durations for both male and female actors were 19sec, 16sec, and 13sec respectively. The choice
of the walking speeds was based on the distribution obtained in the pilot study. All videos were
filmed on one of the streets in a northeastern town. No obvious signs that were definite indicators
of the specific location were visible. Besides a walking target, no other pedestrians or cars were
present in the films. The length of the street segment visible was 20.7 meters.
Dispositional walking speed measure.

The procedure measuring participants’

dispositional speed was identical to the one used in the pilot study.
However, there could be a bias in perception of one’s own walking speed. Observing
another person walk, if one draws conclusions about similarity by comparing the walking speed
of the person observed to their own, it may be that their perceived, as opposed to absolute,
walking speed serves as the criterion for the comparison. Thus, close to the end of the survey,
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participants were also asked how fast they think they walk in comparison to other students at
their college. This served as an alternative measure of a walking speed.
Mind attribution scales.

A scale measuring mind attribution to targets observed in the

videos consisted of 19 items (Appendix A). Fifteen of them were the mind attributes that Gray et
al. (2007) used: 7 of the questions pertaining to agency dimension and 8 to experience dimension.
The other 4 items were mind attributes used by Morewedge et al. (2007). In addition, the scale
included 12 filler items. Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale with end points
“Not at all” and “Very much” the extent to which the person in the video appeared to be capable
of remembering, feeling pride, being competent, etc.
The same 19 items were used to measure perception of own mind (self-mind) (Appendix
B), and stereotypical mind attributions to slow and fast walkers (Appendix C). These latter scales,
however, included 20 different filler items. This was done to prevent participants from making a
logical connection between these scales and the mental capacity ratings that they were asked to
provide for the targets observed in the videos. For the self-mind and stereotype questionnaires,
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which a given statement (e.g. has good memory,
intelligent, able to feel embarrassment, etc.) was about them or about a typical slow or a typical
fast walker respectively. Seven-point Likert scales with end-points “Nothing like me” and “Very
much like me” or “Nothing like the person” and “Very much like the person” were used.
Perceived similarity.

It was hypothesized that if the walking speed of a person in a

video is close to the dispositional gait speed of an observer, this resemblance will suggest
similarity between the observer and the person in the video. In order to check whether such an
association had occurred, we assessed perceived similarity between self and the person in the
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video. Participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they
agreed with each of the two statements, “The person in the video is nothing like me” and “I think
that person in the video and I may have a lot in common,” the first statement being reverse coded.
Target speed recognition.

Slow, medium and fast walking speeds of the targets

presented in the videos differed by more than 0.5 km/hr from each other, which was shown to be
as detectable speed discrepancy. However, in order to reassure that in the video stimuli designed
for the present study the speed discrepancies were also detectable, a speed discrepancy
recognition question was included in the survey packet. Participants were asked what they
thought about walking speeds of the persons in the videos in relationship to each other.
Participants could pick one of the following answer options: “A: The person in Video 1 walked
faster than the person in Video 1,” “B: The person in Video 1 walked slower than the person in
Video 2,” “C: The people walked at roughly the same speed,” or “D: I do not remember.”
Item desirability.

To assess desirability of mind attributes, a questionnaire was created

asking participants to rate how desirable each of the 19 items describing mental capacities
appeared (Alicke, 1985). Bipolar 7-point Likert scale with end points “Very undesirable” and
“Very desirable” was used (Appendix E).
Target likability.

To assess likability of the observed walking targets, participants were

asked to rate on a 6-point Likert scale how much they agree with each of the three statements, “I
think I could really like the person in the first video if I met him/her”, “I think the person in the
first video is a good person”, “I think I the person in the first video is a friendly person.” The
statements were designed using the example of Kozak et al.’s (2006) likability assessment.
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Desire for Control is a 20-item scale measuring the extent to which

a person aspires to have control over his or her environment and life events (Burger & Cooper,
1979). Respondents indicate how each of given statements (e.g. “I’d rather run my own business
and make my

own mistakes than listen to someone else’s orders”, “I prefer a job where I

have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it” describes them using 7-point Likert scale
with endpoints “The statement does not apply to me at all” and “The statement always applies to
me.”
Need for closure.

Need for closure scale measures one’s need for cognitive closure. It

consists of 42 statements describing either preference of clarity (e.g. “I don't like to go into a
situation without knowing what I can expect from it”, “I usually make important decisions
quickly and confidently”) or preference of open options and comfort with ambiguity (e.g. “I
think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment”, “When considering most conflict
situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right”). Respondents are asked to rate the
extent to which they agree with each of the statements using a 6-point Likert scale anchored with
“Strongly agree” and “Strongly disagree”. Reliability and consistency of the scale was shown
elsewhere (e.g. Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski, Webster,
& Kelm, 1993).
Preexistent familiarity with video targets.

Actors who walked in the current clips were

students of the same undergraduate institution where the study was conducted. If a participant
recognized the actors in the videos, it would create a confound. Therefore, after participants
completed target mind attribution scale as well as likability and similarity scales, they were
asked whether the persons they observed in the films were familiar to them.
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Due to the fact that current experiment consisted of multiple lengthy

measures, there was a risk that participants would be too overwhelmed and would stop paying
attention. Attention depletion could result in satisficing (i.e. responding without thinking about
the questions and simply satisfying a survey) and, hence, unreliable responses (Stolte, 1994).
Furthermore, five scales (target mind attribution-2, self-mind-1, slow/fast walker mind
attribution-2) included the same mind attribution items. Even though the scales included filler
items, seeing similar questions five times in the same experiment could have appeared redundant
thereby creating a greater risk that the participants would respond similarly to all scales. Thus, 4
distractor tasks were employed in the experiment. The tasks were designed to require little
cognitive effort. In two of the tasks participants were presented with two images and were asked
to find as many differences between them as they could in 30 seconds (Appendix D). As the time
elapsed, participants were asked to report the number of differences they could count. In another
task, participants were shown an image with overlapping animal contours and were asked to
count as many animals as they could in given 30 seconds (Appendix D). Final distractor task was
the need for cognition scale.
Attention check.

To control for possible satisficing two attention check questions were

included in the experiment. The first of these questions was included in the need for closure scale
and asked participants to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statement, “I
am currently a student at a college or a university.” The second attention check questions was
contained within the desire for control measure and required participants to rate the extent to
which the statement “I am forty years of age or older” applied to them. Since participants of this
study were undergraduate students under age of 40, incorrect responses to these questions would
allow me to screen out participants who were answering the questions without reading them.
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Procedure
The time slots for this study were scheduled at least 15 minutes apart from each other and
accommodated one participant per slot. The researcher explained that the purpose of the current
study was to investigate how people perceive others while having very little information about
them. Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent form, after which they were
invited to an individual cubicle where they would complete the survey.
The participants were given a life habit questionnaire consisting of 12 questions (e.g. “On
average, how many books do you read per year?”, “How often do you eat at restaurants?”) and
were told that it was a pilot study for an unrelated experiment. Upon their completion, the
researcher asked participants if they could do her a favor and drop their filled out questionnaire
in the survey box located outside the lab. In reality, the life habit questionnaire was an excuse to
have participants walk to the survey box and back so that the researcher could record their
walking speed.
When the participants returned to their cubicles, the researcher told them that they will
watch two short videos and fill out a reaction questionnaire after each. In both videos,
participants observed a person walking down the street. In one of the videos, the person was a
female and in another video it was a male. A person in a video walked at one of the three speeds:
slow, medium, or fast. However, persons in the first and the second videos did not walk at the
same speed. In other words, if in the first video a person walked at the slow speed, then in the
second video a person walked at either medium or fast speed; and if in the first video a person
walked at the medium speed, then in the second video a person walked at either slow or fast
speed. The order of videos was counterbalanced in terms of actor’s gender and speeds, resulting
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in 12 possible combinations of videos. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these.
After watching each video once, participants were given target mind attribution, likability, and
perceived similarity scales and were asked if they have seen the person in the video before.
The order of the subsequent questionnaires was as follows: need for cognition (distractor
task1), recognition of targets’ walking speeds discrepancies, distractor task 2, self-mind 2 , need
for closure, distractor task3, slow walking person stereotype, desire for control, distractor task4,
fast walking person stereotype, item desirability, and demographics. As participants completed
the survey, they were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Data from 2 participants were was not included in the analyses because these participants
responded incorrectly to one of the attention check questions. One more participant was excluded
from the analyses as an outlier since his walking speed z-score was 4.07.
Out of 64 participants, 22 were male and 42 were female. Age of the participants ranged
from 18 to 25 years old with the mean age of 20. Sixty-nine percent of the participants were
white, 9% were African American or Hispanic, 13% were Asian, and 9% identified themselves
as other.
Dispositional walking speed was missing for two of the participants. The dispositional
walking speeds ranged from 4.28km/hr and 7.62km/hr and were normally distributed with a
mean of 5.44km/hr, a mode of 5.39km/hr, and a median of 5.40km/hr (Figure 3). The

2

The order in which self-mind scale and mind attribution stereotype scales were presented was
also counterbalanced.
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distribution was shifted 1km/hr towards faster speeds in comparison to that obtained from the
pilot study. One of the possible reasons could be that during the pilot study, participants were not
given very clear instructions explaining how to get to the survey box, and as a result the
participants could have been looking around and hence walked slower (Finnis & Walton, 2008).
Dispositional Walking Speed Distribution

Figure 3.

Distribution of participants’ dispositional walking speeds in the experiment.
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Data Transformation
In the following analyses, the mind attributed to a target in the first video watched was
used as the criterion. Data from the second video watched was not included in the analyses 3 .
A new continuous variable, speed match (SpMa), was created by subtracting participants’
walking speed from that of the target in the video to which he or she was exposed and taking an
absolute value of the difference. Hence, the smaller the SpMa score, the greater the match
between participant’s dispositional speed and the speed of observed target.
Note that the walking speeds of the targets in the videos were chosen based on the results
of the pilot study in order to best approximate slow, medium, and fast speeds common for the
location where the study was conducted. To address the hypotheses of the present research, a
wide enough range of speed match between target and participant walking speeds was needed. In
other words, some of the target walking speeds had to be similar to the ones of the participants
and some had to be slower or faster. Despite the fact that target speeds were based on the
walking speed distribution obtained in the pilot study which was distorted, the obtained speed
match range was acceptable: 0 - 0.5km/hr: 17 participants, 0.5 - 1km/hr: 19 participants, 1 1.5km/hr: 14 participants, 1.5 - 2km/hr: 12 participants (Figure 4). The present range is
satisfactory as speed differences are detectable at 0.5km/hr discrepancies (Jacobs & Shiffrar,
2005).
Reliability analyses showed that responses to all 19 items of the mind attribution scale
were inter-correlated for slow, a = .94, medium, a = .91, and fast, a = .85 video conditions.
Therefore, for each participant, a single score indicating mind attribution to a target was
3

Given time constraints of this project and given that results from the first video did not appear promising in regard
to the research hypothesis, results from the second video were not analyzed.
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calculated by creating a mean of responses to all individual items. Similarly, composite scores
were calculated self-mind (Chronbach’s a = .82), typical slow (Chronbach’s a = .88) and typical
fast (Chronbach’s a = .89) walkers as well as for the desirability (Chronbach’s a = .90), need for
closure (Chronbach’s a = .66), and desire for control (Chronbach’s a = .72) scales. Furthermore,
responses to two questions targeting participants’ perceived similarity to a target (SimP) they
observed in the video were highly correlated, r = .68, p < .001. Thus a single score for SimP was
calculated by taking a mean of the two responses.
Speed Match

Figure 4. The degree to which a participant’s dispositional walking speed matched
the speed of a target the participant observed in the first video.
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In addition, a new variable speed match perceived was created to capture the match
between the speed with which participants thought they walked and the real walking speed of
observed target in the video.
Preliminary Analyses
No participant recognized either one of the actors in the videos. Participants were
generally able to correctly identify walking speed discrepancies between the targets in the first
and the second videos, t = 3.73, p < .001, supporting the findings of Jacobs & Shiffrar (2005)
that people are able to discriminate between differences in walking speeds deviating by as little
as 0.5km/hr.
In addition, participants were mostly accurate evaluating their own walking speed in
comparison to that of their peers. Actual walking speed of the participants was positively
associated with their self-speed ratings, r = .26, p = .04.
Next, there seemed to be a dispositional tendency across participants to attribute high or
low mind experiences. The ratings of mental capacities of a target in the video, self-mind, and
imagined slow and fast walkers were inter-correlated across participants. All correlations were
significant, and ranged between r = .31, p = .01 and r = .47, p < .001 (see Table 1). Thus,
participants who thought that a video target possessed a lot of mind were also more likely to
think that they and slow and fast walkers have a lot of mind.
Even though the ratings of self-mind were correlated with video target mind and
stereotypes, I wanted to see if participants evaluated their own mental capacities as higher than
those of others. For this analysis, I calculated differences between the ratings of self-mind and
target mind (TargetDiff), self-mind and slow walker mind (SlowDiff), and self-mind and fast
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Table 1
Mind Attribution Correlations
Video Target
Mind
Video Target Mind

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Self-Mind

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Fast Walker Stereotype

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Slow Walker Stereotype

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Fast Walker
Stereotype

Self-Mind

Slow Walker
Stereotype

.314*

.470**

.412**

.011

.000

.001

64

64

64

64

.314*

1

.350**

.379**

.004

.002

.011
64

64

64

64

**

**

1

.406**

.470

.350

.000

.004

64

64

64

64

**

**

**

1

.412

.379

.001
.406

.001

.002

.001

64

64

64

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

walker mind (FastDiff). For each difference variable, a score above zero indicated that a
participant attributed more mind to self than to the particular party, and a score below zero
indicated the opposite. One-sample t-test determined that the participants indeed granted
themselves more mental capacities than they granted the video target (TargetDiff M = .64) t
= .75, p < .001; the arbitrary slow walker (SlowDiff M = .89) t = 9.69, p < .001; and the
arbitrary fast walker (FastDiff M = .50) t = 5.8, p < .001. However, self-mind was not associated
with the desirability of mind attributes, r = .15, p = .22 suggesting that the items’ favorability
was not related to participants’ evaluation of their own mental states.
Furthermore, to see if there was a difference in stereotypes held about minds of slow and
fast walkers, the stereotype difference (SterDiff) score was calculated for each participant by
subtracting a mind score of the slow hypothetical walker from a mind score of the fast

64
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hypothetical walker. Similarly to the difference variables described previously, a SterDiff score
above zero indicated that the fast walker was attributed more mind than the slow walker, and a
SterDiff score below zero indicated the opposite. The mean SterDiff score across participants
was positive (M = .36) and differed significantly from zero, t (64) = 3.76, p < .001, suggesting
that the participants tended to attribute more mind to an arbitrary fast walking person than to an
arbitrary slow walking person.
Interestingly, in contradiction to findings by Morewedge et al. (2007), there was no
difference between the mind attributed to fast (M = 5.14), medium (M = 5.08), and slow (M =
5.08) walking targets, F (2, 62) = .07, p = .93.
Main Analyses
According to my hypothesis, the extent to which observer’s dispositional walking speed
matches the speed of a walking target should predict the amount of mind the observer attributes
to the target. Hence, the speed match (SpMa) variable is the main predictor and is included in all
of the following analyses unless indicated otherwise. Likewise, mind attributed to a video target
served as the criterion. Since the range of the mind attribution scores to a target in the video was
very small, with most scores falling in between 4 and 6.5 on a 7-point scale, target mind
attribution scores were Z transformed across participants as done by Morewedge et al. (2007).
There was no correlation between SpMa and mind attributed to a walking target, r = -0.4,
p = .78. Hence, the extent to which participants’ dispositional walking speed was similar to the
speed of a target in the video did not predict the amount of mind attributed to the target.
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I had predicted that if person’s dispositional walking

speed is similar to that of a target, he or she would project his or her own mental states onto the
target. Therefore, the following analyses include mind attributed to self as a predictor.
A multivariate linear regression conducted with SpMa, self-mind, and their interaction
term as predictors of mind attribution to a walking target showed that there was no significant
main effect of SpMa, β = .11, p = .93, SelfM, β = .32, p = .18, or interaction, β = -.12, p = .93.
When recognition of speed discrepancies (correct or incorrect) was included as another predictor
variable, the three-way interaction speed match*self-mind*speed recognition appeared to reach
significance, β = 1.79, p = .12. However, further regression analysis revealed that the effect
seemed to emerge among participants, who did not correctly identify targets’ speed differences
in the videos, β = -1.22, p = .13, which contradicts the original hypothesis.
Introducing need for closure as a predictor variable did not produce a significant
interaction of speed match*self-mind*need for closure, β = -.12, p = .41. Furthermore, neither
desire for control nor likability of a target seemed to moderate the results. Interactions of speed
match*self-mind*desire for control, β = .01, p = .93 and speed match*self-mind*likability, β = .18, p = .63 were non-significant.
Speedmatch and stereotypes.

The amount of mind attributed to a target in the video did

not differ as a function of stereotype beliefs about fast and slow walkers, F(2, 54) = .51, p = .60.
Thus, participants, who thought that a slow walker would generally possesses greater mental
capacities than a fast walker, attributed just as much mind to a target in the video walking at slow
(M = 4.91) speed as to targets walking at fast (M = 5.13) or medium (M = 5.21) speeds. Similarly,
participants who rated a typical fast walker to have more mind than a typical slow walker did not
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rate fast-walking target (M = 5.12) in the video to have more mind than targets walking at slow
(M = 5.21) or medium (M = 5.03) speeds. It seems that participants’ beliefs about mind
experience of slow and fast walkers did not make a difference in how they perceived the mind of
targets walking in the video.
Perceived similarity and projection.

It was hypothesized that, if observer’s

dispositional walking speed is close to the walking speed of a target, the observer would perceive
the target as similar to him/herself and therefore would project his or her mental states onto the
target. However, the degree to which target’s walking speed approximated that of a participant
was not associated with the participant’s perception of similarity between the video target and
self, r = .02, p = .89. Thus, the degree of speed match did not seem to produce a cue of similarity
between the target and the self as it was originally predicted. Consequently, to investigate
whether the projection of own mental capacities occurs when target is perceived to be similar to
self, instead of the speed match variable, the following regression analysis included perceived
similarity as a predictor of the target mind. Self-mind served as the second predictor. However,
the interaction perceived similarity*self-mind was non-significant, β = -.33, p = .82. In other
words, the perceived similarity was not related to how participants evaluated the video target’s
mind in comparison to their own.
Perceived similarity and liking.

Interestingly, perceived similarity was positively

associated with the likability of the target, r = .27, p = .03 and the amount of mind the
participants attributed to a video target, r = .31, p = .01. The latter was true only for the agency
dimension of mind, r = .25, p = .04 but not the experience, r = .19, p = .13. Furthermore, degree
to which participants reported to like a video target was positively correlated with the amount of
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mind participants attributed to him/her, r = .26, p = .03, and again this association occurred only
for the agency dimension, r = .39 p < .01 and not the experience, r = -.03, p = .83.
Discussion
Previous research on mind attribution suggests that when evaluating mental capacities of
others, our judgment may be subject to the timescale bias (Morewedge et al., 2007). In particular,
when confronted with a novel agent, people appear to have a tendency to attribute more mind to
the agent if its speed of movement is close to the average human speed. Prior research has shown
that the timescale bias exists for non-human as well as human targets. In the study by
Morewedge et al. (2007), participants thought that a human target walking at the average human
walking speed was more intelligent, smart, competent, and simply had more mind than those
walking slower or faster. The purpose of the present study was to examine an underlying
mechanism of this phenomenon and determine its moderators.
One of the possible explanations for the timescale bias effect could be egocentrism
(Morewedge et al, 2007). When confronted with a novel agent, one needs a reference point in
order to understand and speculate about an agent’s behavior and/or mind (Higgins, 1996; Nisbett
& Ross, 1980). A reasonable starting point for induction could be existing easily accessible
knowledge about a similar agent. Egocentric bias occurs when one uses knowledge about the self
as the reference point, which results in attributing one’s own thoughts, desires, characteristics,
etc. to a target in question. Thus, one of the possible explanations of the effect found in the study
by Morewedge et al. (2007) could be that the people perceived the target human walking at the
average speed as the most similar to them and as a result projected their own mental capacities
onto the target (Ames, 2004; Watson et al, 2000). People’s tendency to grant themselves with
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more mental capacities than they grant others (Morewedge et al., 2007) could have resulted in
the attribution of more mind to the average walking target than to the slow and fast walking
targets. The reason why people assimilated best with the target walking at the average speed
could have been the choice of targets’ walking speeds. In the study by Morewedge et al. (2007),
participants watched a video of a person walking at slow, average, or fast speeds. However, slow
and fast speeds displayed in the videos were outside of the range of the normal human walking
speed. As a result, it could be that the speed of the average walker approximated best the walking
speeds of the participants, and they projected their mental capacities onto this target and not onto
the slow and fast walkers. Thus, in order to investigate whether egocentrism and self-projection
truly occur in the timescale bias effect, the present study examined an observer’s dispositional
walking speed as a possible moderator. It was hypothesized that the closer the target’s speed is to
the dispositional walking speed of an observer, the more likely the observer would be to project
his or her own mental capacities onto the target. The observer’s perception of similarity between
the target and the self was hypothesized to be a mediator. In other words, it was thought that the
resemblance between speeds would be positively associated with the perceived similarity, which
in turn, would facilitate the projection.
However, it appears that one projects self-knowledge onto the novel target only if there is
a reason to believe that the target is similar to the self (Ames, 2004). If this does not occur, a
person should resort to another type of easily accessible knowledge, such as stereotypes, and use
it as a reference point instead. Thus, the second hypothesis of the present study was that if a
target’s walking speed is slower or faster than the one of the observer, then the observer would
attribute mental capacities to the target in accordance to the stereotypes they hold about minds of
slow and fast walkers, respectively.

THE UNDERLYING MECHANISM OF THE TIMESCALE BIAS

50

To test the hypotheses, participants were asked to watch a video of a person walking
down the street and complete a questionnaire asking them to evaluate the target’s mental
capacities. The participants also reported their thoughts about their own mental capacities (selfmind) and the mental capacities of typical slow (slow walker stereotypes) and typical fast (fast
walker stereotypes) walkers. Additional moderators examined in the present study were liking of
a target (Kozak et al., 2006) as well as an observer’s need for cognitive closure and desire for
control (Epley et al., 2007).
The methodology of the present research was improved from the one used by Morewedge
et al. (2007) in the following ways. In order to ensure ecological validity, all target walking
speeds used in the video stimulus were within the range of the normal human walking speed.
Unlike the original study, in the stimulus video, an actor walking down the street was the only
moving target visible, with no other people or cars present. In addition, attribution of mental
capacities was examined in terms of two separate dimensions of mind: agency and experience
(Gray et al., 2007). Finally, the desirability of mind attributes was assessed to see if motive of
self-enhancement plays a role in how people attribute mental capacities to the self and others,
and whether favorability of the items in the mind attribution scale is the reason why people grant
themselves and those similar to them with more mental capacities than others.
Mind Dimensions
In assessments of mind attribution, 7 items pertained to the agency dimension and 8
pertained to the experience. I ran Chronbach’s alpha reliability tests for all scales that included
mind attributes: target mind, self-mind, slow walker stereotype, fast walker stereotype, and
desirability. The reliability was very high for all the scales, suggesting that at least in the case of
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the present study, the agency and experience dimensions functioned very similarly. Hence, the
two dimensions were combined to create a single mind attribution score for each scale and were
not differentiated in most of the analyses.
Patterns of Mind Attribution
Several patterns have emerged in ways participants tended to attribute mind. First, scores
of mind attributed to a video target, self, and typical slow and fast walkers were all positively
associated across participants. In other words, participants appeared to have a tendency to
attribute a certain amount of mind regardless of a particular target. Thus, some participants
thought that all targets, including self and others, had very high mental capacities and others
thought that all targets had mental capacities of a moderate level. One of the possible
explanations could be differences in personal understanding and interpretation of the notion of
mind (Perner, 1999). For example, some may think that any normal human should have full
mental capacities such as abilities to remember and feel pain. Others may think that an average
human has only moderate mental capacities, and based on individual differences, some people
may have more or less mind than others. Thus, people may be using a certain anchor for their
judgment of an adult human’s mental capacities and then adjust accordingly. However, as in any
other case of the anchoring heuristic, adjustment may not be complete, and people’s ratings may
remain close to the original anchor (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope & Alfieri,
1997; Read et al., 1990) resulting in all mind attributions around a particular level.
Despite the participants’ apparent dispositional tendency to attribute a certain level of
mind, there were several differences in mind perceptions. First of all, consistent with the
previous research (Gray et al., 2007), participants rated self-mind significantly higher than the
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minds of a video target, a typical slow walker, and a typical fast walker. Thus, people indeed
seem to think that they possess more mental capacities than others. However, this phenomenon
did not seem to be a manifestation of people’s general tendency to rate themselves as better than
average on favorable characteristics (Alicke, 1985; Alicke et al. 1995; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987),
as self-mind was not correlated with the desirability of the mind attributes. In other words, the
degree to which participants perceived the items of mind attribution scale to be positive (i.e.
desirable to have) did not play a role in how participants rated themselves on those items. At first
glance, these results may seem to contradict our motive to self-enhance. However, Haslam et al.
(2005) reported somewhat similar findings. In their study, participants rated themselves higher
on the traits pertaining to human nature (i.e. traits of humanness) than they rated others despite
positive and negative valence of the traits. Furthermore, this so-called self-humanization was not
associated with self-esteem, suggesting that people attributed more humanness to self due to a
motive other than endorsement of positive self-view. The authors proposed that because people
have more profound understanding of their own personalities and mental states and because the
traits of human nature are central to self and “essence-like,” people have a tendency to selfhumanize (Haslam et al., 2005). It is possible that the mind attributes used in the present study
function similarly to the human nature traits. Of course, since items of the mind attribution scale
were not assessed in terms of their essentiality to human nature, the statement above is only an
assumption. Nevertheless, the reasoning may be similar. As Morewedge et al. (2007) speculated,
perhaps people perceive more mental capacities in self simply because they have first-hand
experience with their own sensations and thoughts, and hence their representations of their own
mental states are more elaborate than the representations of the mental states of others (Malle &
Pearce, 2001).
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Participants also attributed more mind to an imagined typical fast walking person than to
a typical slow walking person. Note that undergraduate students at a northeast college constituted
the sample for the present study. It could be that participants associated the “typical fast walker”
with a person who is fast in general. On a college campus, this association could imply a person
who is always on top of his or her course work, is actively involved with extracurricular
activities, and has time for rich social life. Similarly a slow walker could have been associated
with a procrastinator or a person who simply “gets by”. As a result of such associations, the
participants may have concluded that a fast walker must have more mental capacities than a slow
walker. Depending on a population and personal values, however, these associations may differ.
Hence, the effect may not be replicated if the survey is conducted using a different sample.
Interestingly, when watching a person walking in the video, people did not attribute any more
mind to a fast walker than to a slow walker. Thus, the difference in mind attribution emerged
only for hypothetical fast and slow walking people that participants were asked to imagine.
Hence, even though people thought that a fast walker must have more mind than a slow walker,
they did not use these stereotypes when evaluating the mental capacities of an actual person they
were observing.
Self-Projection
The main hypothesis of this study was not supported. Participants’ dispositional walking
speed did not play a role in their perceptions of slow, medium, and fast walking people’s minds.
When a video target speed was close to a participant walking speed, the participants were no
more likely to project their own mental capacities onto the target than when the speeds were
divergent. Furthermore, if a video target speed was slower or faster than a participant speed,
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speculating about the target’s mental capacities, the participants did not appear to project their
stereotypes about minds of slow or fast walkers, respectively.
To investigate why dispositional walking speed has failed as a moderator, I examined
whether the degree of a match between target and participant speeds was associated with the
participants’ perceptions of similarity between the target and the self. The degree of speed match,
however, was not correlated with participants’ perceptions of similarity. In other words, the
target’s walking speed did not seem to serve as a cue of resemblance. It should be noted that
most of the participants were quite accurate in evaluating their own walking speeds in
comparison to that of their peers, and most of the participants were able to correctly recognize
the discrepancies in walking speeds of video targets. Thus, failure of a speed match as cue of
resemblance cannot be attributed to the biased perceptions of personal walking speed or the
inability to recognize speed differences within the range used in the present study.
Since speed match did not facilitate perceptions of resemblance, another regression
analysis was run using perceived similarity as a predictor instead. However, even when
participants perceived a video target as similar to themselves, they were not more likely to
project their own mental capacities onto the target than when the target was thought to be
dissimilar. Other moderators examined in this study were liking of a video target and participants’
dispositional need for cognitive closure and desire for control. None of these variables moderated
projection of the observer’s own mental capacities onto a walking target. Thus, it appears that
projection of one’s own mental capacities does not occur in the process of mind attribution to
human targets, which further suggests that egocentrism may not be the underlying mechanism as
was originally suggested.
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The Timescale Bias Effect?
Interestingly, the timescale bias effect was not replicated in the present study. A video
target walking at the average human speed was attributed no more mind than the targets walking
at slower and faster speeds. As mentioned earlier, the video stimulus of the present study differed
from the one used by Morewedge et al. (2007) in two important ways. First, in the original study,
slow and fast speeds with which a target human walked were outside of the normal human speed
range. In the present study, on the other hand, all speeds were within the normal range but were
divergent enough for the differences to be recognizable. Thus, findings of the present study
certainly put into question whether the timescale bias even exists for the normal speeds. Of
course at times one could observe a person walking extremely fast because he or she is in a rush
or a person walking unusually slowly because he or she does not feel well. In these cases, the
observer may exhibit the timescale bias. However, in most of the situations, when a person
happens to walk at a realistic speed that is simply slower or faster than average, the person’s
speed probably will not make a difference in how one perceives his or her mental capacities. In
addition, in the study by Morewedge et al. (2007), a target human in a video was walking down
the street that was crowded with other walking pedestrians. As a result, slow and fast walking
targets truly stood out, and it could be that the participants attributed less mental capacities to
these targets because they looked abnormal against other walking pedestrians. Thus, the only
certain conclusion that can be drawn about the timescale bias effect is that it may occur when an
observed person for a particular reason walks unusually fast or slow while other pedestrians on
the street walk at the speeds within the normal human walking range.
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Likability and Similarity
The amount of mind attributed to a video target only correlated with likability of a target
and perceived similarity. These results were consistent with the findings by Kozak et al. (2006).
In their study, they manipulated how likable a person in question appeared. Then they assessed
positivity towards the target by asking participants to evaluate the target on liking, goodness,
respect, and similarity. Responses to all items were shown to make up the positivity index.
Except for the question about respect, the present study employed very similar items when
assessing perceived similarity and target likability. Moreover, the ratings of similarity and
likability were correlated, suggesting that liking and similarity may in fact constitute one single
construct -- positivity. Kozak and colleagues (2006) found that greater positivity towards the
target actually encouraged the perceiver to consider the target’s underlying mental states. It
seems that people were more likely to identify intentions and cognitive processes of a liked
target than of a disliked target and, as a result, attributed more mind to the liked target.
Moreover, in the present study, the similarity and liking of a target were positively
associated with attributions of agency but not experience. The agency dimension describes mind
in terms of cognition and includes such capacities as intelligence, competency, memory, etc. The
experience dimension, on the other hand, recognizes capacities for sensation and emotion and
includes such items as ability to feel pain, embarrassment, pleasure, etc. These results are also a
replication of the findings by Kozak et al. (2006), who reported that people were more likely to
attribute intentions and cognition to the liked target, but not emotion. The differential attribution
of agency and experience to a target supports the existence of two distinct mind dimensions and
may imply that the identification of emotion and cognition in others occurs via different
processes (Gray et al., 2007; Kozak et al., 2006; Gray & Wegner, 2009). Thus, the results of the
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present study indicate that positivity towards a target was the only variable related to the amount
of mind attributed to a video target. The more participants liked a target and perceived him or her
to be similar to the self, the more mental capacities they tended to attribute to that target. In the
end, it appears that perceived similarity does play a role, but in a different way than originally
proposed. Instead of promoting projection of their own mental states onto the target, perceived
similarity seems to function as a part of positivity towards the target, facilitating greater
identification with the target’s mental states. However, which features of a target encouraged
greater positivity is inconclusive as the present results do not permit any related speculations.
Morewedge et al. (2007) did not assess liking of a target or perceived similarity in their
study. It could be that the participants had greater positivity towards the target walking at the
average speed than towards the other targets because he or she appeared to be the most similar to
the other pedestrians and the participants themselves. It has been shown, for example, that
matching behavior promotes liking (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Thus, it is quite possible that
the average walkers were liked the best and were attributed the most mental capacities.
Limitations
There were several limitations to the present research. First of all, 19 items assessing
mind attributions were presented in 6 different surveys. First participants completed 2 target
mind questionnaires, one after each video they watched. Then they were asked to fill out
questionnaires of self-mind, slow and fast stereotypes, and desirability. Despite filler questions in
every questionnaire and distractor tasks between most of the mind attribution scales, it is quite
possible that the participants noticed that the questions were repeating multiple times and, as a
result, responded similarly to the remembered items. This could explain why scores on all mind
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attribution scales were correlated between each other. However, failure to replicate the timescale
bias effect cannot be attributed to this limitation since target mind attribution scale was presented
first and could not have been contaminated by other scales. Furthermore, even though mind
attribution scales were correlated, there were still significant differences in ratings of self and
others. For example, the study replicated the finding that people grant themselves more mind
than others and found that hypothetical slow walkers were thought to have less mental capacities
than hypothetical fast walkers. In sum, even though this limitation should be considered, it did
not seem to have a substantial impact on the findings.
Another possible limitation of this study could have been its extensive length. It took
participants about 45 minutes to complete the entire survey. It could be that the participants were
overwhelmed by the number of the questionnaires. As their mental resources were depleted, the
participants could have been responding to questions to simply get through the survey without
paying particular attention to the questions or responses they were providing. This effect is
known as satisficing and describes a phenomenon when respondents provide minimally
acceptable answers to simply satisfy a questionnaire (Krosnick, 2000). Manifestations of
satisficing could be providing similar responses to all items in a questionnaire. Satisficing also
could explain correlations between all mind attribution scales and small range in target mind
attribution scores. However, since target mind was assessed first, the chance of satisficing for
this questionnaire was less likely due to depletion of mental resources. It is possible, nevertheless,
that this task was especially demanding since the participants were asked to provide their
opinions about mental capacities of a person whom they have seen walking for a few brief
seconds. Thus, difficulty of this task and perhaps not knowing what to respond could have
encouraged satisficing after all. However, the current study replicated associations between the
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mind attributed to a target and liking, suggesting that the current data did not completely lack
validity.
One could argue that due to satisficing, all mind attribution scales were inter-correlated
and that correlation of target mind with liking and similarity is just another manifestation of
satisfying the survey and responding similarly to all questions. Once again, however, despite the
correlations there were meaningful differences in ratings of self-mind and minds of others. In
regard to correlations involving liking and perceived similarity, first of all, these two variables
correlated only with the agency dimension of mind and not the experience, which is also a
replication of previous findings. In addition, liking and similarity were associated only with
target mind and not self-mind, slow walker mind, or fast walker mind. Thus, there is no strong
evidence that the present findings were limited by the satisficing contaminated data.
Another possible limitation of the study is social desirability. This bias occurs when
participants respond to questions in a way that presents them in a positive light (e.g. Nederhof,
1985). In this study, participants were told that the goal of the present research was to investigate
how people are able to speculate about traits and characteristics of others without having much
information about them. This could have led participants to think that the research was studying
how people make negative judgments about others before knowing them. Being a person who
prejudges others is certainly not how one would want to appear. Hence, even though the surveys
were anonymous, participants may have been biased when rating the mental capacities of a video
target, which could explain the small range of scores and why all target mind attribution means
were above moderate level. Social desirability could potentially be the reason why the timescale
bias effect was not replicated in the present study and why people attributed the same amount of
mind to slow, average, and fast walkers.
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Directions for Future Research
The results of the present study suggest that one’s walking speed, as long as within the
normal human range, does not make a difference in how others perceive a walker’s mental
capacities. These findings imply that the timescale bias may occur in a very limited number of
real-life situations. However, it is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions based on the results
of one study, especially since the current null findings could have been a result of limitations to
the experiment design. Nevertheless, ecological validity of the timescale bias effect is
undermined, and future research should focus on thoroughly examining the commonality of the
bias in mind attributions to human targets.
Unlike the target’s walking speed, the observer’s positivity towards the target appears to
play a key role in how the observer perceives a target’s mind in terms of agency. However, what
happens to the dimension of experience? Does liking and perceived similarity facilitate only
more thorough identification of a target’s cognitive process or may this depend on how the target
is portrayed? In the study by Kozak et al. (2006), a target was portrayed as either likable or
dislikable, which was achieved by describing the target’s actions and interests. Since no explicit
information communicating the target’s capabilities to experience emotion was given, it is
logical that the participants only considered cognition behind likable target’s actions but left out
emotion (Kozak et al., 2006). In the current study, participants observed a person walking down
the street. No other information about the person was given. It could be that in this case,
participants’ attention likewise was called to only actions of the person; hence, only possible
underlying intentions and thoughts were considered. As a result, participants may have attributed
more agency to a better liked target than to a less liked target, but did not differentiate between
the targets’ capacities for experience. Another study showed that when a target was described as
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sensitive to pain, in the subsequent evaluations, people were likely to attribute more experience
to this target in general than to the one who was originally described as less sensitive to pain
(Gray & Wegner, 2009: study 3a). These findings provide a hint that the type of information
available about a target may make a difference in how the target’s mind is perceived in terms of
the two dimensions. Thus, future studies should investigate the role of positivity towards a target
in the process of mind attribution when the target is described in terms of his or her emotions and
sensations. If the portrait of a target focused on his or her feelings, perhaps greater liking and
positivity towards a target would facilitate better identification with the target’s emotions, hence
promoting greater attribution of capacities for experience.
Another remaining question is whether liking and perceived similarity truly comprise one
single factor of positivity towards a target. These two constructs seem to be very closely related,
but could they function independently? If so, may one precede the other? Previous research has
illustrated that a person’s mimicry of another party’s movements during their interaction
facilitates greater liking of the person (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Hence, it could be that in mind
attribution studies, perceptions of similarity between the self and a target occurs first and then
promotes liking of the target. However, assume that a target is perceived as likable but dissimilar
to the self. Would the liking alone still have the same effect as the positivity and promote better
identification of the target’s mental capacities? Hence, would greater liking of a target, without
perceived similarity, result in greater mind attribution? The importance of perceived similarity
and its relation to liking is still to be investigated in the context of mind attribution.
Another direction, which research on mind attribution could take, involves language and
communication abilities. Dennett (1996) suggests that much of our knowledge about other minds
comes from others’ abilities to communicate their mental states with us. He argued that the
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reason why we understand minds of other adult humans much better than minds of other
mammals is because humans are able to explain to us their mental experiences in a
comprehensive way. One may say that the reason we understand human minds better is because
we are also human. This is of course true, but to a certain extent. A person in a coma, for
example, is also a human as is a newborn. However, we can only guess what goes on in their
minds and what their mental capacities are like. Similarly, if one meets an adult human who does
not speak the same language, the one would have certain difficulties understanding the other
person’s intentions, needs, and mental states. Perhaps some basic understanding of what the
person wants or tries to do could be reached, but he or she would not be understood as well as
someone else who speaks the language. Thus, the target’s inability or difficulty to communicate
clearly may prevent the other party from acquiring a good representation of the target’s mental
states, which may result in attribution of less mental capacities to the target. Due to a similar bias,
if such exists, people may be prejudiced towards others who have difficulties speaking,
foreigners who are not fluent in a language of a host country, or even people with accents or
speech impediments. While these are only speculations, the role of language in the process of
mind attribution may be an interesting material for future research.
Conclusion
Previous research has suggested the existence of the timescale bias, people’s tendency to
attribute more mind to others walking at the average human speed than to others walking at
slower or faster speeds. The present study investigated whether egocentrism and self-projection
were the underlying processes of the bias. The results did not support the research hypothesis
that people would attribute more mind to the targets whose walking speeds are similar to theirs
as a result of projection of their own mental capacities onto the target. There was no indication
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that a match in walking speeds facilitates greater perceived similarity between the target and the
self, and there was no evidence of projection of one’s own mental capacities onto the target.
Perceived similarity and liking of a target, however, seemed to be key determinants in
how people attributed mental capacities to the target. As suggested by previous research, when
people exhibit greater positivity (i.e. liking and similarity) towards a target, they are more likely
to consider the target’s intentions and cognitive processes, thus acquiring better representation of
the target’s mental states. Through this mechanism, greater positivity towards a person may
facilitate attribution of more mental capacities to him or her.
Furthermore, findings of the present study suggest that, in the process of mind attribution
to other humans, the timescale bias may not be a common phenomenon and may occur only in
specific situations when a target’s walking speed is outside of the range of the normal human
speed. However, further research is needed to comprehensively investigate ecological validity of
the timescale bias effect.
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Appendix A
Mind Attribution to a Human Walking Target
Now we will ask you a series of questions about the person in the video you just watched.
You may find some questions difficult to answer without additional information about the
person, but we ask you to give your best guess. Please do not skip any question and answer
them in the order they are presented. Don’t think too hard about any one question, just
answer with your natural responses. We are looking for people’s gut-level reactions to these
questions.
Please read each question about the person in the video carefully and write the number that

corresponds with your answer on the line next to each question.

1

2

3

Not at all

4

5

Moderately

_____ How capable is the person in the video of remembering?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of exercising self-control?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of morality?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of recognizing emotions of others?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of planning?
_____ How capable is the person in the video to communicate with others?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of thinking?
_____ How smart is the person in the video?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of feeling hunger?
_____ How much mind does the person in the video appear to have?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of feeling pain?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of feeling pleasure?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of feeling pride?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of feeling embarrassment?

6

7
Very Much
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_____ How capable is the person in the video of feeling joy?
_____ How much personality does the person in the video have?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of experiencing consciousness?
_____ How intelligent is the person in the video?
_____ How competent is the person in the video?

Filler Items
_____ Do you think the person in the video is able of cooking French food?
_____ Do you think the person in the video is able to play soccer?
_____ How much do you think the person in the video likes action movies?
_____ How much do you think the person in the video likes to sing?
_____Do you think the person in the video can be successful in their career?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of climbing a high mountain?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of solving difficult math problems?
_____ How capable is the person in the video of acting?
_____ Do you think the person in the video texts a lot?
_____ Do you think the person in the video is social?
_____ Do you think the person in the video is a good driver?
_____ Do you think the person in the video is emotional?
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Appendix B
Self-Mind
Using the scale below please indicate the extent to which each of the following descriptors applies
to YOU. Please write the number that corresponds with your answer in the spaces provided.
1

2

3

Nothing
like me
_____ Has good memory
_____ Has self-control
_____ Is moral
_____ Able to recognize emotions in others
_____ Able to plan
_____ Has mind
_____ Able to communicate well
_____ Able to think
_____ Able to feel pain
_____ Able to feel hunger
_____ Able to experience pleasure
_____ Able to feel pride
_____ Smart
_____ Able to feel embarrassment
_____ Able to feel joy
_____ Has complex personality
_____ Conscious
_____ Intelligent
_____ Competent

4
Somewhat
like me

5

6

7
Very much
like me
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Filler Items
_____ Likes to study
_____ Dances well
_____ Hard-working
_____ Relaxed
_____ Enthusiastic
_____ Daydreams often
_____ Cooks well
_____ Learns quickly
_____ Plays sports
_____ Likes winter
_____ Able to give advice
_____ Able to “read between the lines”
_____ Likes action movies
_____ Likes parties
_____ Social
_____ Playful
_____ Charismatic
_____ Able to sympathize
_____ Likes cats
_____ Able to detect lies easily
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Appendix C
Slow/Fast Walker Mind Attribution Stereotypes
Please IMAGINE a person who generally walks SLOWER/FASTER THAN MOST PEOPLE.
Please DO NOT think of any single person in particular. Rather, please consider a "typical"
person who walks slowly/fast. Using the scale provided, please give your best guess about how
each of the following descriptors may apply to this person who walks slower/faster than most
people. Please click the box that corresponds with your answer.
1
Nothing like
the person

2

3

4
Somewhat
like the person

Items identical to those in Self-Mind scale (see Appendix B)

5

6

7
Very much like
the person
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Appendix D
VISUAL TASK!
It's time for visual exercise! This task is called "Find the Differences." On the next screen you will
see two images. Your task is to find as many differences between the two images as you can in 30
seconds. When 30 seconds elapse, the images will disappear, and you will be asked to report the
number of differences you counted.
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VISUAL TASK!
This is the next visual exercise. Similar to the first, this is the "Find the Differences" task. On the
next
you will
see twothe
images.
Your
task
to find
as many
Find screen
7 differences
between
two lady
cats
andis mark
them
off ondifferences
the picturs:between the two
images as you can in 30 seconds. When 30 seconds elapse, the images will disappear, and you will
be asked to report the number of differences you counted.
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VISUAL TASK!
This is another visual exercise. On the next screen you will see contours of animals. Your task is
to count as many animals as you can. As before, the screen will be presented for ONLY 30
seconds. When 30 seconds elapse, the image will disappear, and you will be asked to report the
number of animals you counted.
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Appendix E
Desirability Scale
Please rate desirability of each listed item by writing the number that corresponds with your
answer in the space provided. A characteristic or a state is considered desirable if it is something
good to have and undesirable if it is something bad to have.
1
Very
undesirable

2
Undesirable

3
Somewhat
undesirable

4
Neither desirable
nor undesirable

_____ A good memory
_____ A good amount of Self-control
_____ Morality
_____ Ability to recognize others’ emotions
_____ Ability to plan for future events
_____ Ability to communicate
_____ Ability to think
_____ Ability to feel pain
_____ Ability to feel hunger
_____ Ability to experience pleasure
_____ Ability to feel pride
_____ Ability to feel embarrassment
_____ Ability to feel joy
_____ Having personality
_____ Experiencing consciousness
_____ Intelligence
_____ Being smart
_____ Competence
_____ Having mind

5

6

Somewhat
desirable

Desirable

7
Very
desirable

